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INTRODUCTION 
I. PREFATORY REMARKS 
Appellants’ initial brief focused largely on a single word: “development”.   
As previously explained, this word is critical because the CDA’s protection does 
not extend to any material that a website provider creates or develops. 
In her response, Ms. Jones also focuses on the meaning of development.   In 
a nutshell, she argues the term develop is synonymous with the term publish.  
According to Ms. Jones, a website owner who acts like a publisher or an editor, for 
example by choosing which material to publish and which to reject, thereby 
“develops” such content and is thus never protected by the CDA.  This is the same 
circuitous logic applied by the district court when it found the CDA only applies to 
those who do not screen (and thus do not develop) content. 
This reply explains this position is wrong.  It is a non sequitur which ignores 
both the language and the purpose of the CDA.  The meaning of development 
cannot be based on acts of publishing because “§ 230 forbids the imposition of 
publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-
regulatory functions.” Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 
1997).  As such, “‘development of information’ … means something more 
substantial than merely editing portions of [third party content] and selecting 
material for publication.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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In light of the CDA’s intended purpose—to prevent plaintiffs and courts 
from treating website owners as publishers—the question of what constitutes 
“development” simply cannot turn on whether the website acts like a publisher.  
The CDA’s raison d’être is to give website owners the freedom to perform 
editorial and publisher functions like reviewing and screening content without 
facing liability as publishers or speakers; “the exclusion of ‘publisher’ liability 
necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to 
choose among proffered material and to edit the material published while retaining 
its basic form and message.”  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.  In short, in the context of 
the CDA, publishing can never constitute development.  Never. 
As the district court did, Ms. Jones seems to disregard this rule entirely, 
arguing that Mr. Richie “develops” unlawful material by choosing to publish it: 
Richie acted as an information content provider by encouraging the 
development of the offensive content about Ms. Jones. Specifically, 
Richie fully controlled the dirty.com website: 1) he acted as the editor 
and selected small percentage of submissions to be posted, 2) he 
reviewed submissions without verifying accuracy, and 3) decided if 
postings should be removed, if he received an objection to a post. 
 
Resp. at 8.  If this Court holds that a person “develops” content by choosing which 
material to publish and which to reject, the CDA will literally swallow itself whole 
and disappear, along with countless websites the law was intended to protect.  This 
is why the district court’s denial of immunity cannot stand. 
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In addition to discussing that point, this reply brief concludes with a new 
word—clarity.  Above all else, the CDA’s value derives from one thing: its clarity.  
Clarity in the CDA is essential because the law was not merely intended to shield 
websites from liability; it was also intended to protect them from “having to fight 
costly and protracted legal battles.”  Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley 
v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008).  To ensure this 
benefit has real meaning, “courts that have addressed these issues have generally 
interpreted Section 230 immunity broadly, so as to effectuate Congress’s ‘policy 
choice ... not to deter harmful online speech through the ... route of imposing tort 
liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially 
injurious messages.’” Universal Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 
(1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31).  
In short, there is a direct correlation between the CDA’s value and its clarity.  
Standards which are vague or ambiguous (such as the “encouragement” test 
advocated by Ms. Jones) would convert this essential law into something akin to a 
screen door on a submarine.  Any such attempt to dilute the CDA with ambiguity 
must be firmly rejected, “lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing 
websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they 
promoted or encouraged–or at least tacitly assented to–the illegality of third 
parties.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis added). 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Correct Standard For Development Is Making A “Material 
Contribution” To The Unlawful Nature Of Content, Not 
“Encouragement” Or “Totality Of The Circumstances” 
As explained in Appellants’ principal brief, the district court erroneously 
held that if a website owner does anything to “encourage” the submission of 
“offensive” content, then it has “developed” such content and is no longer immune.  
This rule was based entirely on dicta taken from FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1187 (10th Cir. 2009) and Roommates. 
As noted by Appellants and various amici, the district court simply 
misapplied both Accusearch and Roommates.  Although both cases certainly 
mention the concept of “encouragement”, neither case actually used that standard 
to deny immunity.   
Rather, both cases applied a very different rule—that “a website helps to 
develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it 
contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”  Accusearch, 570 
F.3d at 1200 (emphasis added) (quoting Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1168).  Far from 
adopting an “encouragement” test, the Ninth Circuit in fact rejected the idea that 
generalized encouragement will affect immunity; “Such weak encouragement 
cannot strip a website of its section 230 immunity, lest that immunity be rendered 
meaningless as a practical matter.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1174. 
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These points are perhaps best summarized by a single case; Shiamili v. The 
Real Estate Group of New York, Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 17 N.Y.3d 281 (N.Y. 
2011).  This case was already discussed at length in Appellants’ principal brief so a 
full analysis will not be repeated here except to note that whatever Mr. Richie did 
to “develop” content in this case was far less substantial than in Shiamili. 
Both cases involved websites with mildly derogatory names.1  Both cases 
involved allegations that the website owner “encouraged” the posting of negative 
material which defamed the plaintiff.  In both cases, the website operators added 
their own comments which were offensive but not actionable.  In both cases, the 
plaintiffs cited Roommates and Accusearch as support for their position, and in 
both cases the trial court initially denied CDA immunity. 
However, this case differs from Shiamili in at least two important ways.  
First, in Shiamili, the plaintiff and the defendant were direct competitors; both 
were involved in the highly competitive New York real estate industry.  See 
Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 284.  This fact (which gave serious concern to the lone 
dissenting judge) is not present in this case.  Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Richie 
and Ms. Jones were complete strangers who had never met or spoken prior to this 
case.  See ECF Doc. #64–2 at Page ID 483 (Richie Aff. ¶ 20). 
                                           
1 The name of the website at issue in Shiamili was www.ShittyHabitats.com.  The 
website name is not mentioned in the court’s opinion, but it is referenced in the 
appellate briefs, 2009 WL 8073983, *5 and in the Complaint, 2008 WL 8980579. 
      Case: 13-5946     Document: 006111931850     Filed: 01/09/2014     Page: 9
 6 
Second and more importantly, in Shiamili the defendant did far more than 
Mr. Richie to “develop” the defamatory comments but the court still found the 
CDA applied because none of these acts were material.  Specifically, the offending 
speech in Shiamili was initially found in a user-submitted comment about an 
existing discussion thread.  See Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 285.  After seeing the 
comment about Mr. Shiamili and his company, Ardor Realty, the website operator 
moved it to a stand-alone post with a new heading entitled: “and now it’s time for 
your weekly dose of hate, brought to you unedited, once again, by ‘Ardor Realty 
Sucks’. and for the record, we are so. not. afraid.”  Id. (all emphasis in original).  
Because the post accused Mr. Shiamili of being racist and anti-Semitic, the website 
owner added an image of Jesus Christ with the plaintiff’s face superimposed on top 
with the words: “Chris Shiamili: King of the Token Jews.”  Id. 
Clearly, the website operator in Shiamili did far more to “develop” and 
“adopt” the third party content than Mr. Richie did.  In this case (like in Shiamili), 
Mr. Richie reviewed the third-party content containing the actionable material, 
selected it for publication, and he made a brief sarcastic quip about it.  However, 
unlike in Shiamili, Mr. Richie did nothing more to enhance or augment the 
statements about Ms. Jones; he passively displayed them exactly as they were 
submitted to the site.  Clearly, if the website operator’s conduct in Shiamili was 
insufficient to qualify as “development”, the same must be said here. 
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This is so because the correct standard for “development” is not the vague 
“encouragement” test applied by the district court.  Rather, the correct test is 
whether the website owner “contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the 
conduct.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1168.   In Shiamili, none of the website 
operator’s actions materially contributed to the defamatory nature of the third party 
statements, therefore the CDA still applied.  The same is true here. 
B. Mr. Richie Did Not Materially Contribute To The Unlawful Content 
As reflected below, the main post at issue, ECF Doc. #64–2, Page ID #509, 
contained some content from a third party and some content from Mr. Richie: 
Content From Third Party  Content From Mr. Richie 
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As explained in paragraphs 19–22 of Mr. Richie’s first summary judgment 
affidavit, all of the content which Ms. Jones alleged to be defamatory was 
submitted to the site by a third party.  ECF Doc. #64–2, Page ID #483.  Mr. Richie 
did not create, alter, or modify this content in any way; he merely added his one-
line rhetorical “freak in the sack” remark after the fact. 
In this posture, the question is not whether Mr. Richie created or developed 
something.  The issue is whether he created or developed the specific content that 
Ms. Jones claimed was false.  See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 833 
n.11, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 703, 717 n.11 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 2002) (holding, “The 
critical issue is whether [the website operator] acted as an information content 
provider with respect to the information that … is false or misleading.”); see also 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining, “even assuming [defendant] Matchmaker could be considered an 
information content provider, the statute precludes treatment as a publisher or 
speaker for ‘any information provided by another information content provider.’  
The statute would still bar [plaintiff] Carafano’s claims unless Matchmaker created 
or developed the particular information at issue.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
47 U.S.C. §  230(c)(1)). 
Here, every word that Ms. Jones claimed was defamatory is found solely in 
the content from the third party author which Mr. Richie neither created nor 
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changed.  If false, that speech would be actionable even without Mr. Richie’s after-
the-fact remark, and Mr. Richie’s “freak in the sack” comment “was obviously 
satirical and, although offensive, it cannot by itself support [a] claim of 
defamation.”  Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 293, 952 N.E.2d at 1020.  As such, Mr. 
Richie’s rhetorical quip did not materially contribute to the actionable content. 
The only remaining conduct which might be seen as “development” is 
limited to Mr. Richie’s decision to select and publish the post in the first place 
without verifying its accuracy, and his failure to immediately remove the post after 
Ms. Jones notified him it was false.  This conduct per se cannot qualify as 
“development” because this is exactly what the CDA protects; “The claim against 
the website was, in effect, that it failed to review each user-created profile to 
ensure that it wasn’t defamatory.  That is precisely the kind of activity for which 
Congress intended to grant absolution with the passage of section 230.”  
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1171–72.  The Ninth Circuit repeated the same 
admonition over and over multiple times in Roommates; “Section 230 requires us 
to scrutinize particularly closely any claim that can be boiled down to the failure of 
an interactive computer service to edit or block user-generated content that it 
believes was tendered for posting online, as that is the very activity Congress 
sought to immunize by passing the section.”  Id. at 1172 n.32 (emphasis added).   
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Although the district court relied almost entirely on Roommates and 
Accusearch as support for its decision, Ms. Jones offers essentially no discussion 
or analysis of Roommates, and she mentions Accusearch just twice in her brief 
devoting less than a single page to it.  See Resp. at 16.  In that discussion, Ms. 
Jones admits that “The Accusearch court held that one is not responsible for 
‘developing’ allegedly actionable content only ‘if one’s conduct was neutral with 
respect to the offensiveness of the content[]’” id. (quoting Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 
1199), and she concedes that under Roommates, “the word develop does not 
include an action as innocuous as the inclusion of a [blank] text box for additional 
comments.”  Resp. at 18.   Ms. Jones then argues these points “only help to 
strengthen the argument that Richie did develop the culpable content.”  Id. 
Ms. Jones simply misunderstands the meaning of these observations and 
how they apply to the facts of this case.  In other words, Ms. Jones seems to be 
making a res ipsa loquitur-type argument—i.e., that because TheDirty.com 
contains some offensive content, the site as a whole is not neutral and therefore 
Appellants must have “encouraged” all such offensive content because no website 
would contain offensive content without encouragement from the site’s operator. 
 This argument fails as a matter of both fact and law.  Legally, the question 
of whether a website’s conduct is “neutral” does not focus on the nature or type of 
content submitted by users.  Rather, the focus is on whether the site itself creates or 
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TheDirty.com Post Submission Form 
ECF Doc. #64–2 at Page ID 505 
requires unlawful content (as in Accusearch and Roommates) or whether it is 
merely possible that unlawful content might be submitted.  In the latter scenario, 
“if the tools provided by a website may be used to generate either lawful or 
unlawful content depending on decisions made by the user, these tools are ‘neutral’ 
and do not implicate the website in the development of unlawful content.”  Hill v. 
StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 559 (N.C.App. 2012) (citing Jurin v. Google, Inc., 
695 F.Supp.2d 1117 (E.D.Cal. 2010)). 
Factually, the undisputed evidence showed Appellants did not and do not 
require users to submit unlawful content, nor are users required to submit only 
negative or offensive content.  On the contrary—the site provides entirely content-
neutral tools such as the blank form visitors use to upload new posts which may 
cover any topic whatsoever such as news, sports, politics, sex, NFL cheerleaders, 
or any combination thereof. 
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Although the website’s form generically suggests that users may wish to 
“submit dirt”, there is nothing inherently unlawful about “dirt”, nor does the form 
require users to submit false or unlawful content.  Rather, the only guidance 
offered is neutral; i.e., “tell us Who, What, When, Where, Why.” 
This blank box is identical to the “Additional Comments” feature described 
in Roommates which “prompts subscribers to ‘take a moment to personalize your 
profile by writing a paragraph or two describing yourself and what you are looking 
for in a roommate.’ The subscriber is presented with a blank text box, in which he 
can type as much or as little about himself as he wishes.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 
1173 (emphasis added).  Although the plaintiff in Roommates argued that some 
people might use this feature to include unlawful material in their profiles, the 
Ninth Circuit found even if that was true, the website owner was not responsible 
for “developing” any such material: 
Roommate publishes these comments as written.  It does not provide 
any specific guidance as to what the essay should contain, nor does it 
urge subscribers to input discriminatory preferences.  Roommate is not 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of this content, 
which comes entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by 
Roommate.  Without reviewing every essay, Roommate would have 
no way to distinguish unlawful discriminatory preferences from 
perfectly legitimate statements.  Nor can there be any doubt that this 
information was tendered to Roommate for publication online.  This is 
precisely the kind of situation for which section 230 was designed to 
provide immunity.              
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis added).    
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Although this language could not be clearer, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly 
emphasized that merely allowing users to submit something is per se insufficient to 
qualify as development; “It’s true that, under a pedantic interpretation of the term 
‘develop,’ any action by the website–including the mere act of making a text box 
available to write in–could be seen as ‘develop[ing]’ content. However, we have 
already rejected such a broad reading of the term ‘develop’ because it would defeat 
the purpose of section 230.”  Id. at 1174 n.38 (emphasis added). 
It is simply impossible to square these points from Roommates with the 
district court’s holding in this case.  Here, the uncontroverted evidence shows that 
Appellants’ website provides exactly the same type of blank box which a third 
party may use to input either lawful content or unlawful content.  Decisions 
regarding what to say and how to say it are made solely by third parties, not by 
Appellants.  For that reason, even if some people choose to post defamatory or 
unlawful content, the CDA still applies because “if the tools provided by a website 
may be used to generate either lawful or unlawful content depending on decisions 
made by the user, these tools are ‘neutral’ and do not implicate the website in the 
development of unlawful content.”  Hill,  727 S.E.2d at 559 (emphasis added). 
Appellants provide nothing but neutral tools for users to create content.  As 
such, Roommates fully supports Appellants’ position and does not justify the denial 
of immunity. 
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C. This Court Should Follow Hill v. StubHub 
As noted in Appellants’ initial brief, since 1996 there have been hundreds of 
reported CDA cases and only a tiny handful resulted in a denial of immunity.  In 
fact, Appellants’ research suggests this is the first case since the CDA was adopted 
in 1996 in which a website operator has endured trial (not once, but twice) and was 
held liable for defamatory content posted by a third party.2 
While the outcome in this case is literally unprecedented, it is not entirely 
unique.  For instance, in addition to Shiamili, there has been at least one 
procedurally similar case—Hill v. StubHub—where a trial court erroneously 
denied CDA immunity only to have that ruling reversed on appeal.  Like in 
Shiamili, an immediate interlocutory appeal followed in Hill and the lower court’s 
denial of immunity was reversed.  See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550 
(N.C.App. 2012).  This posture makes Hill highly instructive, particularly because 
the plaintiff’s legal arguments (which the trial court initially accepted) are 
strikingly similar if not identical to the arguments Ms. Jones makes here. 
                                           
2 The two best-known exceptions are Roommates and Accusearch.  However, 
neither case involved a trial and neither case involved defamation claims.  The 
defendant in Roommates ultimately prevailed on the merits and thus the plaintiff 
was awarded nothing.  See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012) (Roommates II).   Similarly, 
Accusearch was not a defamation case; it was an unfair business practice case in 
which the plaintiff (the Federal Trade Commission) obtained the disgorgement of 
$199,692.71 in profits earned by the defendant from the sale of unlawful phone 
records. 
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Hill was a class-action lawsuit filed against the owner of a website called 
www.StubHub.com.  As the name suggests, the site allowed third party users to 
buy and sell tickets to concerts and sporting events.  The facts of the case were 
simple—the plaintiff purchased four tickets to a Miley Cyrus concert and was 
charged more than face value for each ticket.  See Hill, 2011 WL 1675043, *1.  
The plaintiff was also charged a service fee in excess of $3.00.  Both acts were 
facial violations of North Carolina’s anti-scalping statue.  In addition to suing the 
third party scalper, the plaintiffs also sued StubHub, arguing that it was liable for 
the scalper’s unlawful conduct. 
The website argued that it was protected by the CDA because it merely 
offered a marketplace in which third parties bought and sold tickets.  Thus, if a 
particular seller chose to offer tickets above face value (in violation of North 
Carolina law), the seller was responsible for that choice but StubHub itself was not.   
As occurred here, the trial court rejected this argument and found the CDA 
did not apply because the website owner took various steps to “encourage” the 
posting of unlawful content (tickets priced above face value).  The trial court began 
its analysis by correctly observing, “It is clear that the CDA is an immunity statute 
designed to protect website operators from liability for content posted by others.”  
Id. at *2.  The court also initially noted that the appropriate standard was the 
“material contribution” test from Roommates.  See id. 
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After these initial points, the court veered far off the beaten path, blazing a 
trail paved with familiar dicta from Roommates and Accusearch.  The court’s 
analysis sounds strikingly similar to the district court’s conclusions in this case: 
A review of the cases below leads this court to conclude that an 
internet service provider crosses the line and becomes liable for 
content on its website when the internet service provider (“ISP”) 
materially contributes to and/or specifically encourages the offending 
content.  To “materially contribute” in this context means to influence 
the offending content in a way that promotes the violation of law that 
is represented by the offending content.  To “specifically encourage” 
means to elicit and make aggressive use of the offending content in the 
business of the internet service provider.  Each case must be decided 
on its own facts, giving deference to the public policy embodied in the 
statute. Cases in which the offending content is unlawful require a 
heightened degree of materiality and specificity. Intent to violate the 
law is not required. Conscious disregard by an internet service 
provider of known and persistent violations of law by content 
providers may impact the courts’ determinations of the service 
provider’s claim to immunity, especially where the ISP profits from 
the violations. 
 
Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
 
Based on this mélange of rules cobbled together from Roommates and 
Accusearch, the court found the CDA did not apply because the website owner did 
various things to “specifically encourage” (and thus develop) acts of scalping.  For 
example, the court noted that StubHub’s content was not neutral with respect to the 
types of tickets sold.  Specifically, the site only allowed users to sell tickets to the 
most popular events which were thus more attractive to scalpers: “StubHub screens 
out low-demand listings.  It actively monitors its inventory for each selected event.  
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Its business model is thus focused at the outset on sales of tickets to events with a 
high probability of garnering premium prices above the face value of the event 
ticket.” Id. at *9.   This point is comparable to the assertion that Appellants’ 
website encourages the posting of only “dirt”; i.e., material that might be unlawful. 
In addition to limiting the types of tickets available, StubHub also used 
pricing tools and strategies to ensure that tickets were sold at the highest price.  
This encouraged unlawfully overpriced tickets because “by focusing on [sellers] 
who are in business to make a profit on re-sales, assisting them in pricing, and 
generating a significant portion of its revenue from them, StubHub creates a 
pricing process that assures that the market price of a ticket will exceed the face 
value with respect to at least 30% to 50% of its sales.”  Id. at 11.   
Finally, the court also noted various other ways in which StubHub was 
directly involved in each transaction: 
StubHub is involved in the process between the buyer and seller in 
numerous other ways.  It controls payment and delivery, prohibiting 
contact between buyer and seller.  It profits from its delivery charges. 
It serves as a guarantor to both the buyer and seller. 
… 
These activities standing alone do not make StubHub a content 
provider, but they demonstrate that StubHub is in total control of the 
transaction.  The only thing it does not do is enter the actual price or 
make the final price decision for most sellers.  It is the party 
conducting the transaction even though it is not setting the price. 
 
 
Id. at *13 (emphasis added). 
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Again, this argument is essentially the same as Ms. Jones’s position.   
According to Ms. Jones, “It is not just the name of the site, or just the use of a 
tagline that makes the CDA inapplicable to Richie.  It is all of these items, taken 
together, which demonstrates that Richie is responsible for developing the tortious 
content on the website and specifically the content relating to Ms. Jones.”  Resp. at 
14 (emphasis added).  In other words, Ms. Jones contends “development” should 
measured by a vague “totality of the circumstances” approach rather than focusing 
on any discrete acts which materially contributed to the specific actionable content.    
This is the same logic applied by the trial court in Hill.  After considering 
the site as a whole, the court found StubHub was not entitled to immunity: 
StubHub encouraged, materially contributed to, and made aggressive 
use of the pricing content on its website.  It profited from tickets sold 
at prices higher than face value.  It was consciously indifferent and 
willfully blind to the illegal prices being posted, knowing that the 
predictable consequences of its pricing model would be the generation 
of illegal prices.  It is not entitled to immunity.  It does not qualify as a 
Good Samaritan. 
 
Id. 
 
 After rejecting immunity, the trial court permitted the defendant to 
immediately appeal, noting the “denial of immunity affects a substantial right of 
StubHub and that an immediate review of the denial of immunity would promote 
judicial economy and efficiency.”  Id.  On interlocutory review, the Court of 
Appeals unanimously reversed the denial of immunity.  See 727 S.E.2d 550. 
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 To begin, the Court of Appeals found the trial court erred by considering 
broader aspects of the site rather than focusing on the specific content at issue; “a 
proper inquiry into the extent to which Defendant is entitled to claim immunity 
from liability pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 must focus upon the specific content at 
issue in this case, which is the price at which [the scalper] sold the tickets to Ms. 
Hill … .”  Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 555 (emphasis added).  The Court of Appeals 
rejected the trial court’s decision to evaluate the defendant’s website as a whole; 
“instead of focusing upon the specific content at issue in this case, the trial court 
determined that Defendant’s website, considered as a whole, was not entitled to 
immunity from liability pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 … . We conclude, however, 
that the trial court’s ‘entire website’ approach was fatally flawed in a number of 
respects.”  Id. at 562.  After reviewing Roommates and Accusearch, the Court of 
Appeals reiterated: “As a result of the general acceptance by other federal and state 
courts of the rubric deemed appropriate in Roommates, the appellate cases 
addressing immunity claims arising under 47 U.S.C. § 230 have analyzed the 
specific content alleged to be unlawful rather than examining the entire website on 
a more generic basis.”  Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
 After analyzing the law and accepting the “material contribution” test from 
Roommates, the Hill court explained that “if the tools provided by a website may 
be used to generate either lawful or unlawful content depending on decisions made 
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by the user, these tools are ‘neutral’ and do not implicate the website in the 
development of unlawful content.”  Id. at 559 (emphasis added) (citing Jurin v. 
Google, Inc., 695 F.Supp.2d 1117 (E.D.Cal. 2010)).   The court further noted that 
although the Ninth Circuit found that certain aspects of the Roommates website fell 
outside the CDA’s protection, immunity still applied to the “Additional 
Comments” section of that site; “since the users had the unlimited ability to 
determine the content of the material that was posted in that location.”  Hill, 727 
S.E.2d at 558. 
 Based on these standards from Roommates, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that StubHub was immune because the only unlawful content—the price at which 
the tickets were sold—was controlled by the seller.  Thus, even if the website 
“encouraged” higher prices, immunity still applied; “in order to lose the benefit of 
the exemption from liability granted by 47 U.S.C. § 230 based upon content 
actually posted by third parties … a website must effectively control3 the content 
posted by those third parties or take other actions which essentially ensure the 
creation of unlawful material.”  Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (emphasis added).   
                                           
3 In this context, phrase “effectively control” clearly did not refer to editorial 
control such as selecting which material to publish and which to reject.  Instead, 
the Court was referring to the sort of control discussed in Accusearch in which the 
website owner directly controlled the buying and selling of content which the site 
knew was “inherently unlawful”. 
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Because the ultimate decision to offer unlawfully overpriced tickets was a 
choice made by the seller, not the website operator, the Court of Appeals found the 
website remained immune under the CDA even assuming the site “encouraged” 
higher prices.  This Court should adopt this logic and reach the same conclusion. 
 
D. To Preserve Clarity In The CDA, This Court Must Reject Either 
“Encouragement” or “Totality Of The Circumstances” As A 
Proper Test For “Development” 
As explained above and in Appellants’ principal brief, the CDA was not 
intended to merely shield website owners (and users) from final liability.  Like 
other forms of immunity, the CDA serves a more practical purpose—it shields 
websites owners from the cost of litigation.  See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254–55 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining, 
“‘immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability’ and ‘it 
is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’  We thus aim to 
resolve the question of § 230 immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case 
because that immunity protects websites not only from ‘ultimate liability, but also 
from “having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.’” (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 366 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175); Nasser v. WhitePages, Inc., 2013 WL 
6147677, *2 (W.D.Va. 2013) (same). 
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The economic importance of protecting website owners from incurring 
$100,000.00 or more in legal fees defending the accuracy of third party speech is 
obvious enough.  However, in the context of the CDA this protection is especially 
significant for reasons which may not be immediately apparent to anyone who is 
not involved in the daily operation of an interactive website. 
The issue relates to the “heckler’s veto”.  In short, the heckler’s veto works 
like this—a person sees online speech they do not like or do not agree with.   The 
unwanted speech can be anything such as: 
• A negative review of a restaurant on Yelp.com; 
• A negative review of a hotel on TripAdvisor.com or Expedia.com; 
• A positive review about a competitor’s product on Amazon.com; 
• A negative review of a judge on TheRobingRoom.com; 
• An opinion doubting the existence of God on DebatingChristianity.com; 
• A comment expressing support for gay marriage or Edward Snowden in 
response to an article on CNN.com. 
Rather than pursing litigation against the author of the offensive material 
(which may be futile if the statements are true or merely the author’s opinion), the 
heckler does something different—he or she threatens to sue the website owner 
unless the objectionable content is immediately removed.  Of course, the website 
owner did not create the content and is thus powerless to defend its accuracy.   
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At that point, the website operator faces a daunting choice—comply with the 
heckler’s demand by removing material which may be entirely lawful or refuse to 
comply and risk years of costly litigation.  But for the CDA, the only viable 
business choice would be immediately comply with all such removal requests 
regardless of merit.   See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163 (noting, “In passing section 
230, Congress sought to spare interactive computer services this grim choice … .”) 
 Congress specifically intended the CDA to protect online speech by 
eliminating the heckler’s veto with not just immunity but also clarity.  This point 
was discussed extensively in Zeran as the Court considered whether immunity was 
affected by “notice” that material was false.  The Fourth Circuit found that liability 
upon notice was inconsistent with the CDA’s intent: 
[N]otice-based liability for interactive computer service providers 
would provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis 
for future lawsuits.   Whenever one was displeased with the speech of 
another party conducted over an interactive computer service, the 
offended party could simply “notify” the relevant service provider, 
claiming the information to be legally defamatory.   In light of the vast 
amount of speech communicated through interactive computer 
services, these notices could produce an impossible burden for service 
providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing 
controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability.   Because the 
probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech 
and on service provider self-regulation are directly contrary to §  230’s 
statutory purposes, we will not assume that Congress intended to leave 
liability upon notice intact. 
 
 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (emphasis added). 
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This same concern has been discussed extensively in other cases.  See 
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33, 57, 146 P.3d 510, 525 (Cal. 2006) (expressing 
concern that “[t]he volume and range of Internet communications make the 
‘heckler’s veto’ a real threat … .   The United States Supreme Court has cautioned 
against reading the CDA to confer such a broad power of censorship on those 
offended by Internet speech.”) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880, 177 S.Ct. 
2329 (1997)). 
 To reduce the damage caused by hecklers, “CDA immunity has been 
interpreted very broadly.”  Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 
F.Supp.2d 929, 931 (D.Ariz. 2008) (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122–23); see 
also Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254 (concurring, “To further the policies 
underlying the CDA, courts have generally accorded § 230 immunity a broad 
scope.”) (citing Universal Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st 
Cir. 2007)).   Indeed, even in one of the rare cases in which immunity was partially 
denied—Roommates—the court recognized this concern and warned that doubts 
must be resolved in favor of immunity and that “section 230 must be interpreted to 
protect websites not merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly 
and protracted legal battles.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1175. 
Ms. Jones ignores these points and seeks to breathe new life into the 
heckler’s veto by asking this Court to ratify the vague and standardless 
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“encouragement” test used by the district court.  Making matters even worse, 
rather than focusing on any specific content or specific acts, Ms. Jones suggests 
that encouragement should be determined based on the “totality of the 
circumstances”.  Specifically, on page 14 of her response, Ms. Jones argues, “It is 
not just the name of the site, or just the use of a tagline that makes the CDA 
inapplicable to Richie.  It is all of these items, taken together, which demonstrates 
that Richie is responsible for developing the tortious content on the website and 
specifically the content relating to Ms. Jones.”  Resp. at 14 (emphasis added).  
Accepting this argument would annihilate the CDA’s clarity.  
With the benefit of nearly six years since the en banc decision in 
Roommates, the time has come to learn from the Ninth Circuit’s mistakes and to 
repair the loss of clarity that case produced.  As noted above, the Ninth Circuit 
mentioned terms such as “encourage” and “solicit” as having some relevance to the 
issue of “development”, but immunity in Roommates was not actually denied on 
that basis.  Rather, after adopting a “material contribution” standard, immunity was 
primarily denied because the website owner materially contributed to the unlawful 
content by creating questions which were alleged (incorrectly) to violate the Fair 
Housing Act.  Because CDA immunity may be lost when a website either creates 
or develops unlawful content, the court’s discussion of development was largely 
superfluous and ultimately far more ambiguous than necessary. 
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As discussed in Roommates, the plaintiff argued that there were actually 
three different unlawful aspects of the site: 1.) questions about sex/race, etc. which 
users were required to answer; 2.) a “search” and “email notification” system 
“which directs emails to subscribers according to discriminatory criteria,” 521 F.3d 
at 1167, and 3.) the ability of users to add “Additional Comments”  to their 
profiles.  The Ninth Circuit found the CDA applied to the “Additional Comments” 
feature, and it also found the CDA did not apply to the allegedly discriminatory 
questions which the website itself created.  As such, the only aspects of the case 
which really involved development or encouragement were the search and email 
notification features. 
As to those points, the Ninth Circuit majority awkwardly suggested the CDA 
did not apply because “Roommate designed its system to use allegedly unlawful 
criteria so as to limit the results of each search, and to force users to participate in 
its discriminatory process.”  Id.  After making this observation and attempting to 
distinguish the search functions of Roommates from other sites like Google and 
Yahoo!, the majority retreated back to its original statement that “we interpret the 
term ‘development’ as referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, 
but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.”  Id. at 1167–68. 
Concerns over the confusing and contradictory analysis employed by the 
majority were shared by several dissenting judges who warned that “the majority’s 
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definition of ‘development’ can be tucked in, let out, or hemmed up to fit almost 
any search engine, creating tremendous uncertainty in an area where Congress 
expected predictability.”  521 F.3d at 1184 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added).  After carefully analyzing the majority’s decision and other authority, the 
dissent concluded, “The CDA does not countenance an exception for the 
solicitation or encouragement of information provided by users.”   Id. at 1185. 
With the benefit of more than a half-decade of hindsight, it is clear the 
dissenting judges in Roommates were correct on this point.  To be sure, Appellants 
fully embrace the majority’s “material contribution” test which is clear, easy to 
understand and easily applied, as occurred in Accusearch.  However, the remaining 
imprecise aspects of the case involving the “search” and “email notification” 
functions and the “encouragement” of allegedly unlawful acts by the website 
owner were ill-conceived both then and now.  This is especially true since the 
defendant prevailed on the merits thus eliminating any further exploration of those 
allegedly unlawful functions.  See Roommates II, 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012).  
As the dissenting judge in Roommates wisely noted, “because the decision today 
will ripple through the billions of web pages already online, and the countless 
pages to come in the future, I would take a cautious, careful, and precise approach 
to the restriction of immunity, not the broad swath cut by the majority.”  521 F.3d 
at 1189 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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 Finally, it is worth noting that in the past six years, the vast majority of 
courts have interpreted Roommates narrowly and in a way that protects websites, 
as Congress intended.  See Gavra v. Google, Inc., 2013 WL 3788241 (N.D.Cal. 
2013) (agreeing, “Section 230 of the CDA was intended ‘to protect websites 
against the evil of liability for failure to remove offensive content.’”) (citing 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1174); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 2012 WL 6725588, *6 
(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Roommates in support of defendant’s immunity claim and 
rejecting argument that defendant “encouraged” unlawful content by failing to 
remove offensive material “in a timely manner.”); Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion 
Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 450, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Roommates as support for 
defendant’s immunity claim and noting “there is simply “no authority for the 
proposition that encouraging the publication of defamatory content makes the 
website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the ‘creation or development’ 
of every post on the site ... .”) (quoting Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, 
LLC, 544 F.Supp.2d 929, 933 (D.Ariz. 2008)); see also GW Equity v. Xcentric 
Ventures, LLC, 2009 WL 62173, *4–5 (N.D.Tex. 2009); Asia Economic Institute, 
LLC v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 2011 WL 2469822, *6 (C.D.Cal. 2011). 
 With these points in mind, the Court should expressly reject the argument 
that “development” includes either “publishing” or merely “encouraging” users to 
submit something to a website.  A vague encouragement rule cannot stand because 
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it could be interpreted to include “just about any function performed by a website.  
But to read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of section 230 by 
swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section otherwise provides.”  
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167. 
 Instead, this Court should adopt the material contribution test which has 
been consistently applied by the vast majority of other courts.  Such a test 
preserves the value of the CDA while leaving plaintiffs free to pursue anyone who 
creates or materially contributes to unlawful online speech in some manner other 
than by merely selecting material for publication. 
II. CONCLUSION  
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be 
reversed and this matter remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of 
Appellants. 
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